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THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF EVIDENCE PRACTICES: MEMORY
ROBERT S. REDMOUNT
The Author, a practicing psychologist, is trained for the practice of law and is a member of the
Connecticut Bar. He developed the present article while he was serving as a Research Associate at
Yale University Law School under a National Institute of Health grant to the University.-EDnToR.
The memory of individual witnesses, as it is
reported in the courtroom, is the largest fact-sub-
stance of juridical decisions. It is frequently in-
tended as the vehicle for the accurate reconstruc-
tion of the past events which form the subject
matter of litigation. A presumption may generally
be said to exist that the memory upon which a
person bases his testimony is reliable. A random
person, given accurate original perception, will,
in the ordinary course of events, reflect a memory
competent to serve most of the purposes for which
it is demanded. However, courts called upon to give
decisions based on the truth, and lawyers retained
to advance partisan causes, are not expected to
rely upon such a presumption categorically. Prac-
tices and rules of evidence were developed to assist
them in detecting faulty recollection and to safe-
guard the accuracy of testimony by testing the
reliability of memory.
I. PRESENT RULES AND PRACTICES IN
RELATION TO MEMORY AND THEIR
PSYCHOLOGICAL INFERENCES
Evidence rules and practices do not prescribe
specific qualitative or quantitative indicia to
qualify the present memory of a witness for testi-
monial purposes or to judge the reliability of
memory once testimony is given. The implicit
recognition that memory cannot be so finely graded
or restricted to defined boundaries is reflected in
the rule that any "impression" or "belief" may be
admissible in the circumstances of the case, so
long as there is inherent in the recollection process
some basis of personal observation.1
I See WIGooRE, EvIDENcE §§726-729 (3d ed. 1940).
The witness' qualification of a positive statement by
the assertion that it presents his "belief" or "impres-
sioh" may be a matter of simple caution on his part,
or it may reflect limitation in either his original obser-
vation or past recollection. If he is using expedient cau-
tion in his statements and hi memory of an event pur-
ports to be positive and definite, this can be established
through questioning on direct examination. The dis-
tinction between qualified observation and qualified
Present memory, of whatever extent and quality,
is initially admissible, and is then subject to im-
pressionistic tests or rule of thumb indices of its
adequacy. Examination to challenge the adequacy
of present memory may be directed to the processes
of memory as they attach to the specific event in
issue, 2 or it may be directed to demonstrated evi-
dences of memory failure in related or unrelated
events within the past or present experience of the
witness.3 Courtroom examinations of memory
facility in the abstract may also be permitted in
a few jurisdictions.4
Examination of memory processes is most usu-
ally directed to collateral matters and not to the
process by which memory takes place. The ade-
recollection is, as a practical matter, difficult to estab-
lish. However, as long as there is some basis for the
testimony in observation and memory, it is admissible
and the limitations, whether from observation or
memory, will reflect on the probative value of the evi-
dence. Cf. WIGMORE, SCIENCE OF JUDIcIAL PROOF
c. 22, §235-54 (1937). See also McComc, HAND-
BOOK OF = LAw OF EVIDENCE 20 and cases cited
in notes 8 & 9 (1954).
2 See WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE §994 (3d Ed. 1940).
3 WIGmORE, op. cit. supra note 2 at §995, and cases
cited in footnote thereto. The examination of past
memory failures, based upon prior events that occurred
out of court, is not allowed by many courts. Examina-
tion is limited to demonstrations of present memory
failures.
4Examinations of this sort have generally been
attempted in relation to a witness' capacity to observe
and to hear. See WiunoR, Id. at §993 and n. 2. Upon
analogy, a similar examination of memory would be
permissible. The use of expert examinations and expert
examiners to test memory facility has been suggested.
See McCoPMCE, op. cit. supra note 1, pp. 97-98;
WIGmoRE, id. at §997, 998; HuTcINs AND SLESINGER,
Some Observations on the Law of Evidence-Menmory, 41
HAnv. L. REv. 860, 869-70 (1928). Cf. Note, Psychi-
atric Aid in Evaluating Credibility of Rape Complainant,
26 IND. L. J. 98 (1950) (cites arguments and cases up-
holding psychiatric examination of complaining wit-
nesses in rape cases for the purpose of determining the
witnesses' credibility). See also United States v. Hiss,
88 F. Supp. 559 (S.D. N.Y. 1950) and related Case
Comment, 30 NEBR. L. R~v. 513 (1951), (psychiatrist
permitted to testify as to the credibility of a witness,
based upon diagnosis derived from court-room obser-
vation).
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quacy of opportunity for the observation and the
acquisition of knowledge, the skill of interpreta-
tion, and the completeness of observation and in-
formation, are the courtroom subject matter of the
operation of memory in relation to a particular
event.' Similarly, examination of memory in the
abstract is generally focused on observational skills.
It is established inferentially that poor memory
for an event exists if observation has been limited
or inadequate, perceptual ability is lacking, or if
logical interpolation is faulty.
Examination of the accuracy of the products
of memory process in relation to the event in issue,
represents the most direct assessment of memory
function in relation to the experience that is the
subject oi testimony. However, examination of
memory production is not limited to matters con-
nected with the event at hand. 6 A free-ranging
examination of memory production in relation to
any events in any context is permitted, subject to
the discretion of the court The underlying pre-
sumption is that "repeated instances of inability
to recollect give the right to doubt the correctness
of an alleged recollection of a material fact." 8 An
inarticulate preposition is that the judge or jury,
in attributing the significance to be attached to
any one or several memory failures, may and per-
haps do consider the difficulty of the event or in-
formation to be remembered, the recency and fre-
quency of its occurrence, its meaningfulness to the
witness, the probable impact or importance of the
event to him, his motivation or readiness to make
observation and memory, etc.
In point of psychological theory, present court-
room practice tests a witness' memory for a specific
event by his skills and opportunities of observation
and by his logical interpolations. A general facility
for memory is posited. It is presumed operative
with equal distinction in all circumstances. Evi-
dence of failure in any number of circumstances is
evidence of failure in regard to any particular
See WIGMORE, id. at §994 and cases there cited
in n. 1.
I See note 3 supra and related text.
7 See WIGMORE, id. at §994 and McCORMICK, op.
cit. supra note 1, pp. 54-56. In cross-examination to
assess a witness' credibility, including his memory, the
criteria of relevancy are vague. The examiner is given
full opportunity for experimental probing and forays
into the large areas of a witness' experience, a conces-
sion to the importance of establishing the credibility
of a witness. The examination is subject to limitation
and narrowing if the line of questioning is likely to
cause undue prejudice to a party or witness, or is likely
to be overly-extended and wasteful in point of time.
\\'tMoRE. id. at §995.
event. It is also presumed that this general memory
facility may be tested in the abstract, through the
largely exclusive use of examinations of simple
observational skills. Impeachment of the nitness
for failure of memory under any of the aforemen-
tioned tests is a matter of impression. Standards
of memory accuracy and reliability are implicit
and non-specific, and are presumably reflected in
the common sense expcrience and impressionistic
judgments of judge and jury.
The legal and courtroom consideration of
memory is not restricted to absolute and unaided
present recollection to be reflected in offered testi-
mony. A further psychological inference is made
that adequate and useful memory of an event may
not always be immediately available to a witness
and ready for articulation. Some fragmentation
and temporary forgetting is inferred. It is further
believed that cues and fragments may facilitate
more complete and articulate, but still reliable.
recollection. On the basis of this set of psycho-
logical inferences, operative by reason of a distilla-
tion of common sense and impressionistic ex-
periences, provision is universally made for the
refreshing of present memory in court during the
course of and as part of a witness' testimony.9
For the purpose of refreshing and improving, a
dormant memory a witness is generally permitted
to use "any artificial aid which under the circum-
stances (and at the discretion of the trial court)
is appropriate and does not seem improperly sug-
gestive."' 0 In particular, writings may be and
commonly are used. It is generally not required
that the writing have been made by the witness
himself," and it need not have been freshly made
0 See WIGmOlE, id. at §758-65 and McComhci,
id. at pp. 14-18.
10 W xIGtoR, CODE Or EvrDEzcE 146-47 (3d ed.
1942). See also Ward v. Morr Transfer Co., 119 Mo.
App. 83, 95 S.W. 964 (1906), but see State v. Patton,
225 Mo. 245, 164 S.W. 233 (1914) (aid or memorandum
must have been made by the witness, and at a time
when the facts were fresh in his memory). Some juris-
dictions follow the Patton case, establishing by memo-
randa some of the same requirements for "present
memory refreshed" as for "past recollection recorded."
See notes 15-18 infra and related text.
11 WiG oRE, EVIDENCE §759 (3d ed. 1940). Wigmore
points out that "any writing whatever is eligible for
use (but) any writing whatever may, in the circum-
stances, become improper." Id. at §758. Various arti-
ficial aids, offered as memoranda to stimulate present
recollection, may in fact represent deliberate suggestion
and coaching by the examiner. The distinction between
legitimate and illegitimate uses of aids is difficult to
draw. The requirement of a memorandum contempo-
raneous with the event to be recalled is a safeguard,
but limitation to this type of memorandum may un-
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after the time of the event.' 2 It is generally the rule
that the writing does not become part of the wit-
ness' testimony and is not. in itself evidence. 3
Implicit in the permissiveness of the procedures
used in refreshing memory is the assumption that
the memory for a particular event is the product of
an association or chain of associations. The asso-
ciation may be readily induced by the presentation
of a stimulus known or thought to be sufficiently
related to an event so as to invoke a more complete
memory of it. The stimulus, in itself, may not be
familiar or complete enough to establish pro tanto
its relevance to the memory response. This latter
most courts assume as a general condition 4 without
investigating the psychological processes involved
in the particular instance of stimulated recollec-
tion. The accuracy and completeness of the rein-
forced memory is checked without reference to the
facts or.inferences of the reinforcement processes.
The tests are, instead, those utilized in connection
with unreinforced memory, heretofore described.
A person's past memory, duly recorded, is also
duly restrict the possibilities and advantages of refresh-
ing memory. See note 92 infra and related text. Fur-
thermore, contemporaneity may raise stronger doubts
that the witness is refreshing his present memory
rather than relying upon a record of past memory
with no present recollection of the past events. CJf.
notes 15-18 infra.
Courts, in their discretion, may decline to permit
the use of the aid to memory as patt of their discretion
in controlling the manner of examination. State v.
Lonardo, 67 F. 2d 883 (2nd CCA 1933); State v. Bradley,
361 Mo. 267, 234 S.W. 2d 556 (1950).
1 VIGOE, id. at §761, and see notes 10 and 11
supra.
'3,McCopmcK, op. cit. supra note 1 at p. 18 and
WmoRE, Id. at §763. Opposing party may, however,
examine it, use it as a basis for cross-examination and
show it to a jury. McCo~uicK, id. at 17 and WiGmoRa,
ibid. See Morris v. United States, 149 Fed. 123 (5th
CCA 1907) (reversible error for district attorney to
show memoranda to witnesses to refresh memory with-
out first submitting them to defendant's attorney, upon
his demand for inspection); State v. Patton, 225 Mo.
245, 164 S.W. 223 (1914) (adverse party is entitled
to see the data used to refresh a witness' memory for
the purposes of cross-examination); State v. Gadwood,
342 Mo. 466, 116 S.W. 2d 42 (1937) (right of inspec-
tion of memoranda used to refresh memory'is conven-
tionally granted but the better rule is that it is a
matter of court discretion; no reversal for failure to
grant inspection in instance of harmless error).
11 "It is quite immaterial by what means the memory
is quickened; it may be a song, or a face, or a newspaper
item, or a writing of some character. It is sufficient
that by some mental operation, however mysterious,
the memory is stimulated to recall the event, for when
so set in motion it functions quite independently of
the actuating cause." Jeuitt v. United States, 15 F. 2d
955, 956 (9th CCA 1926) (dictum).
admissible in evidence.' 5 Though such a record
admitted in evidence is hearsay, it is excepted to
the general rule excluding hearsay when it is pro-
tected by certain safeguards. The memorandum
recorded must have been made when the matter
was fairly fresh in recollection, the time depending
upon the circumstances of each case. 6 The witness
must vouch his belief that the memorandum was
a correct statement of his recollection at the time.
He need not have written the memorandum him-
self but he must have been the observer 8 of the
matter described in the writing. The particular
reliability which appears to except past recollection
recorded from the common vulnerabilities of hear-
say is the time element. It is presumed that there is
an inverse relationship between the recollection
of an event and the time of its occurrence. "Rec-
ollection is believed to grow progressively dimmer
as time goes on, finally fading out altogether."''
The allowable discretion as to the extent of time
beyond an event within which a record is to be
made, permits the inference that there may be in-
sSee WIGMORE, id. at §734-36 and McCoRMcK,
id. at 590-95; see also Note, Past'Recollection Recorded,
28 IA. L. Rsv. 530 (1943).
A few jurisdictions require that the witness must be
shown to have no adequate present memory of an
event before recorded past recollections may be ad-
mitted in evidence. See Jackson v. Pioneer Adhesive
Works, 132 N.J.L. 397, 40 A. 2d 634 (S. Ct. 1945)(memorandum produced by plaintiff, citing the num-
ber of hours he worked, excluded because he had present
memory of the facts). See also Bendett v. Bendett,
315 Mass. 59, 52 N.E. 2d 2 (witness testified on the
basis of present recollection; prior memorandum of
recollection was admitted in evidence but held to be,
in this particular instance, harmless error.) See WIG-
mORE, id. at §738.
16Chamberlin v. Ossipee, 60 N.H. 212, 213 (1880)(doctor's memorandum three days after examination
was "made at a time when the facts... were fresh in
the mind of the witness"). An older and stricter
formula requires that the memorandum must have
been made at or near the time of the event, with little
discretion as to the time element. This view, held by
some courts, is exemplified in Maxwell's Execs. v.
Wilkinson, 113 U.S. 656, 658 (1885) ("at or shortly
after the time of the transaction, and while it must
have been fresh in his memory"). Cf. WiGmoRE, id.
at §745.
17 Brown v. Provident Loan Soc., 282 N.Y. 453,
26 N.E. 2d 965 (1940); Hancock v. Kelly, 81 Ala. 378,
2 So. 281 (1887). In the latter case, the voucher of
accuracy was based upon the witness' reliance upon
habit. He asserted that the memorandum was made
in the usual course of business, as a true and reliable
record of the event. See WIGMORE, id. at §747.
1" Mercantile Trust & Deposit Co. v. Rode, 137 Md.
362, 112 At. 574 (1921); and see WiGOioRE, id. at
§748.
" HUTCHINS AND SLESINGER, Some Observations on




dividual variation in recollection. Certain indi-
viduals may have better memory facility than
others, or certain events may generally be more
easily remembered than others. The admission
of recorded past memory is both looser and more
liberal than the rules and practices concerning
present memory. The heavier weight of credibility
that attaches to a legal presumption gives more
than common value to past statements recording
the recollection of an event. Presumably, the judge
or jury need not even consider the meaningfulness
of the event to the witness, its probable impact or
importance to him, his motivation or readiness to
make observations and commit to memory, etc.
The element of recency, between occurrence and
recording, is by itself inferentially considered a
sufficient safeguard of the reliability of the recol-
lection, enough to establish a legal presumption
to this effect. The liberality of the rules governing
past recollection recorded is reflected in the in-
ference that there may be individual differences in
the adequacy of early recollection of any particular
event.
The element that distinguishes use of a memo-
randum as past recollection recorded with a failure
of present memory sometimes prerequisite to ad-
mission for that purpose,2 and its use as an aid in
the refreshing of present memory, is tenuous and
uncertain, and is left to the judgment of the court.
Discretion is entirely the subject of impression and
there appear to be no systematic or workable in-
ferences and guides.21
In general, however, a substantial psychological
scope attaches to the evidence rules and practices
governing the present and past memory of wit-
nesses. The psychology is mostly a reflection of the
impressionistic experiences and plausible native
sense of thinkers and designers of evidence rules.
Hutchins and Slesinger 22 suggested an improvement
in the intellectual approach to evidence procedures,
and offered the thought, methods and data that
20 See note 15 supra.
21 In fact, it is generally the witness who determines,
by his statement, whether he is using refreshed memory
.or a record of past memory. But his statements are
not conclusive. The court may decide, in the instance
of a present memory refre .'d, that memory is not
in fact revived and the witness is relying upon a past
record. See Weigel v. Powers Elevator Co., 49 N.D. 867,
194 N.W. 113 (1923) (witness testified on basis of
memory refreshed by records; court held memory was
not refreshed and witness was testifying on the basis
of records used without proper foundation). Cf. note 11,
supra.
2 HuTcmNs AND SLESlNGER, op. cit. supra note 19.
were a part of measurement psychology and be-
haviorism up to the time of their writing in 1928.
Their approach was foredoomed because of their
failure to consider the value and place of their
data on memory in the light of contributions of
the other psychologies then existent, and in the
light of the generally limited conceptual develop-
ment of all of the experimental psychologies at-the
time. The claims for the experimental method and
scientific measurement were exaggerated and
specific findings were given overgeneralized mean-
ing. Gardnern in 1940, provided a discursive treat-
ment for problems in evidence law relating to the
perception and memory of witnesses. He worked
through a maze of data and the lack of an integra-
tive framework in much of the experimentation
on memory, relating collections of experimental
findings and authoritative statements to a variety
of propositions in evidence law. Gardner's instruc-
tive contribution is limited to expressing the
wisdom of caution in dealing with evidence rules
and practices.
In the main, a conceptual development of
memory has not been achieved in legal discourse.
While this partly reflects a disinclination in the law
to readily adopt new and unfamiliar definitions and
constructions, it may also have reflected the lack
of sufficient intellectual stimulus and scientific
credibility in the data of experimental psychology.
But with the evolution and solidification of theo-
retical frameworks in psychology, incorporating
wide ranges and more numerous dimensions of
human experience, the meanings as well as the iso-
lated facts of memory can be better hypostatized
today. Memory has been the subject of an exten-
sive accumulation of psychological thought and
knowledge over the past several decades.
II. CURRENT SysmamATic THouGHT AND
KNOWLEDGE ABOUT MEMoRY
Memory, from a pragmatic perspective, is today
best understood as a combination of good theory
and good operative judgment. It is a complex of
processes that cannot in its entirety be conformed
to experimental design. The results of experimenta-
tion are therefore lacking in ultimate definition and
do not permit complete generalizations, though
they do permit of reasonably sound inferences
explainable in terms of theory. Some few dimen-
sions are sufficiently restricted and characteristic
21 GARDNER, The Perception and Memory of Witnesses,
18 CORN. L. Q. 391 (1933).
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of certain individuals so as to permit some more
than the usual level of reliability in general and
normative conclusions.
PREVAILING CONCEPTS OF MEMORY
Memory is today a constituent in three dis-
tinguishable processes around which theory and
industry in psychology have evolved. It is an as-
sociate of the learning process, of the perceptual
processes, and of the emotional processes.24
Learning theorists have emphasized that
memory is a product of a stimulus-response func-
tion2 Certain measurable properties of the original
experiencing of an event provide the preconditions
for memory. Phrased differently, they provide the
stimulus value that will determine the extent of
retention and recall. The memory response is a
function of these stimuli. The memory for a prior
event is also a function of the learning that takes
place in connection with the subsequent experi-
ences of the individual and of the impact of these
later learnings and memories on the earlier memory.
In general, later distortions of original observa-
tions and learning, and failures of memory, are
attributable to this latter process. Learning theo-
rists refer to it as retroactive inhibition.2 6
A vast amount of experimentation in the perspec-
tives of learning theory has established that vivid
impressions are better retained than "run of the
mine" impressionsX, Meaningful material is better
21 The conceptions and experimental data of memory
are extensively covered in interpretive treatises by
WOODWORTH AND SCHLOSBERG, EXPERImENTAL PsY-
CHOLOGY (Rev. ed. 1954), especially c. 23 and 24;
MILLER, UNcoNscIouslmss (1942), especially c. 9; and
R.3APORT, EMOTIONS AND MEMORY (1942). Woodworth
and Scblosberg use the language and perspectives of
learning theory and experimental psychology. Both
Miller and Rapaport reflect the predominant influence
of psychoanalytic thinking in their work.
25 For an effective exposition of learning theory, and
one that comprehensively explores the experiments in
learning relating to memory, see McGEOcH, THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF HuM-N LEARNING (Ikion ed. 1952).
A concise presentation of various facets of memory
conceptualized in terms of learning theory is presented
by HoVLAm, Human Learning and Retcntion, in
STEVENS, HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY
613 (1951).
26 McGEocH, op. cit. supra note 25 at pp. 404, 432;
see also WOODWORTH AND SCHLOSBERG, EXPERI-
MENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 761-767 (Rev. ed. 1954). WOOD-
WORTH AND SCHLOSBERG provide a cursory review of
the thebries and data of retroactive inhibition.
2 CAi=ws, Association, 1 Psy. REv. 476- (1894);
CALKINS, Association: An Essay Analytic and Experi-
mental, 2 Psy. MONOGR. (1896Y; JERsIID, Primacy,
Recency, Frequency, Vividness, 12 J. ExP. Psy. 58
(1929); VAN BusKIRnK, An Experimental Study of
Vividness in Learning and Retention, 15 J. Exp. Psy.
retained than nonsense materialP The forgetting
of learned material is rapid at first and becomes
more and more gradual as time advances.23 As be-
tween two or more experiences competing for the
threshold of effective recall, assuming other things
to be equal, the first, the most recent, most fre-
quently repeated or most intense stimuli of a series
will be longer remembered than the others. 0 An
early theory of retroactive inhibition asserts that
comparative relaxation after the observation of
learning of an event will conduce to better recall.
Turbulence and strenuous mental activity are likely
to reduce the extent of recall." The proposal is a
"soaking in" theory. Rest "soaks in" the memory.
More generally prevailing, however, is the "inter-
ference" theory of retroactive inhibition.32 "For-
563 (1932). In a typical experiment (Jersild), subjects
are orally presented statements of facts concerning fic-
titious entities. The vividness of particular statements
is inferred from the manner of their presentation.
Selected statements are given with gestures of empha-
sis, with considerable pause before or after the state-
ments, with increased loudness, etc. The relative
effects of vividness and non-vividness are measured by
the degree of recall for each kind- of presentation.
23 BOREAS, Experimental Studies of Memory 2. The
rate of forgeuing, 5 PRAKTIKA AcAD. ATm NEs 382
(1930); cf. LEAVITT AND SCHLOSBERG, The Retention
of Verbal and of Motor Skills, 34 J. Exp. Psy. 404
(1944). Boreas found that poems were better recalled
than nonsense syllables. Leavitt and Schlosberg found
that there was better retention for a motor task than
for nonsense syllables. They offered as one explanation
the possibility that learning the motor task involved
more organization of the material than learning non-
sense syllables.
2 This "curve of forgetting" is the product of the
frequently cited pioneer., work of Ebbinghaus on
memory. EBBINGHAUS, Uber das Gediihtnis (1885)
(Trans. as MEMORY: A CONTRIBUTION TO EXPERI-
MENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, by RUGER AND BESSENIUS
(1913). The author, intensively utilizing himself as the
subject, learned lists of nonsense syllables, lay them
aside for a certain interval, relearned them, and then
noted the savings in time or number of readings due
to the partial retention of the effects of the first learn-
ing. Ebbinghaus' findings have since been confirmed
by a number of experimenters. Cf. STRONG, The Eject
of Time-Interval Upon Recognition Memory, 20 PsY.
REv. 339 (1913).
30 JERsrLD, Primacy, Recency, Frequency, Vividness,
12 J. ExP. PsY. 58 (1929); HOLLINGWORTH1, PSY-
CHOLOGY; ITS FACTS AND PRINCIPLES 243-246 (1928).
31 MULLER AND PILZECKER, Experimentelle Beitrdge
zur Lehre rm Geddtclnis, 1 ZEITSCHRIFT PSYCHOLOGIE
ERGXNZ0NGSBAN'D (1900). The experimenters had their
subjects learn a list of nonsense syllables and deter-
mined the degree of recall after a short interval of
time. The interval was spent either in apparent rest
or in strenuous mental activity.
32 See JENKINS AND DALLENBACII, Oblivescence
During Sleep an& Waking, 35 Am. J. Psv. 605 (1924).
The subjects of this study also learned nonsense sylla-
bles and were asked for recall at later specified periods
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getting is not so much a matter of the decay of old
impressions and association as it is a matter of
the interference, inhibition or obliteration of the
old by the new. ' ' 3
Learning theorists have tended to conceptualize
memory in terms of the subsequent behavioral
products of an experience. Memory is a derivative
of varying degrees of integration in earlier learning.
External characteristics of an event were more the
focus for the interpretation of recall and memory
than were the internal interpolations and the proc-
esses of consciousness applied to the event. It is
only in the later theorizing, in the conception of
retroactive inhibition, with the "interference"
theory underlying it, that there begins to evolve
a concept of memory as an active processin the
individual that is in fact modifying previous ex-
perience and not merely registering it for later
recall or simply forgetting it.
The gestalt psychologists offer a variation in the
theoretical formulation of memory based upon
their theories of perception, with the underlying
postulation of subconscious modifications of per-
ceived experiences.34 Koffka, on the basis of experi-
ments in the gestalt orientation, wrote of something
describable as a continuous subconscious activity
of a memory trace, with the whole continually
exerting its unifying pressure on the parts, and the
parts conforming better and better to the general
form of the whole.35 The essential rationality of
perceptions and experience in the human mind is
emphasized. Any vagueness resolves itself in the
subconsious tendency to make uncertainties con-
form to a general pattern of understanding. Con-
gruity and consistent meaning in the stream of ex-
perience, and conformity with normal expectancies,
are highlighted as the forces that condition the
of time. They spent the interval in either a sleeping
or a waking state. See also VAN ORMER, Retention
After Intervals of Sleep and of Waking, 21 ARcH. or
Psy. N 137 (1932). See McGxocn, THE Ps YcHOLOy
OF HUMAN LEARNING, 432-447 (Irion rev. 1952) for
an analysis of various theories of retroactive inhibition.
3 JENCINS AND DALLENBACH, id. at 612.
-KOFFKA, PRiNcIPLEs OF GESTALT, PsYCHOLOGY,
c. 10 & 11 (1935); KOEnLER, GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY,
c. 4, 8 & 9 (1947). The principal formulations of
memory by gestalt psychologists are briefly presented
by KATZ, GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY c. 20 (1950).
'5KOFrKA, ibid., particularly pp. 493-506. Cf.
HENDERSON, Memory For Connected Trains of Thought,
23 PsY. MONOGR. (1903). In his experiment, providing
for the recall of a story, Henderson found that there
was omission on recall of superfluous and incongruous
details and modifications of details so as to conform
to the general plot and meaning of the story.
quality of memory. Bartlett 6 offered in effect a
variant of gestalt theory in his famous studies of
remembering. He concluded that a person, in the
attempted recall and reproduction of a story,
produces a new story in which only some of the
general characteristics and specific details of the
original will be retained. The remainder consists
of a reservoir of the person's past experiences and
thoughts substituting for uncertain elements so
as to retain story consistency and meaning. The
well-noted Ziegarnik experiment 37 demonstrates
another facet of gestalt theory as it applies to
memory. Ziegarnik produced the experimental
effect of a better recollection of interrupted tasks
than of tasks which were carried through to com-
pletion, establishing the individual's need to per-
ceive definition and finality in experience.Hs
The gestalt theories of memory focused on the
tendency of the person to seek order and generality
through his original perception and later recall.
Later students of the perceptual processes began to
consider that there were other moving forces in the
processes of memory, particularly motivation. 9
The perceptual theory of memory was moving in
the general direction of a further emphasis upon the
11 BARTLETT, R.EMEBERING, AN EXPERIMENTAL
AND SOCIAL STtmY, (1932); see also KUHLMAN, On
The Analysis of the Memory Consciousness, 13 Psy.
REv. 316 (1906)...
1 ZEiGARNIx, Uber das Behalten von erledigten iind
unerledigten Handlungen, 9 PsY. FoRscH. 1 (1927). In
this experiment subjects were given a number of
varied tasks to complete. Half of these were inter-
rupted without opportunity for resumption, and half
were carried through to completion. Subjects were then
asked to recall as many of the tasks as possible. Their
recall for interrupted tasks was significantly better.
-sHowever, the effects of time and motivation
vitiate the Zeigarnik result. She herself determined
that with the lapse of time and intervening occurrences
the effect was lost. Frustration of motivation and the
need for achievement will also tend to modify and
even reverse the Zeigarnik results. See Lxwis AND
FRANKLIN, An Experimental Study of the Role of the
Ego in Work, II. The Significance of Task Orientation
In Work, 34 J. Exp. Psy. 195 (1944), and ATINsON,
The Achievement Motive and Recall of Interrupted and
Completed Tasks, 46 J. Exp. Psy. 381 (1953).
9See, e.g., ALLPORT AND POSTM.N, TME Ps cHoL-
OGY OF RUMOR (1947). This study was patterned after
many that assess the memory of single individuals.
Here, one subject's observation was communicated by
him to another person, who in turn communicated it
to another, etc. The last subject's communication was
then compared to the original stimulus that was the
material of the initial observation and communication.
The findings stress the fact that changes tended to
reflect the particular needs and fears of each story-
teller. Embellishment and modification took the form
of exaggeration, elaboration, condensation and "con-
ventionalization."
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processes of consciousness. The external, behavioral
and descriptive phenomena of memory increasingly
represented the by-products of theory and research
and received little or no attention.
The psychoanalytic approach to memory em-
phasizes the intensity and quality of the emotional
factor in experience. Freud noted instances of for-
getting, of names, words, places, etc. 40 Through
meticulous association and analysis he established
that the forgetting was a phenomenon of motiva-
tion and a function of certain effective attributes
and emotional experiences associated with the
"forgotten" elements. Rapaport" elaborated the
Freudian theory of memory in contradistinction
to the learning theory and gestalt viewpoints. He
asserted, "Ideas are apperceived in terms of the
emotions, affects, strivings, wishes, attitudes of
the individual; they become preserved or dis-
torted-that is, organized-according to these;
they are delivered into consciousness-that is,
reproduced-when the affects or attitudes which
were responsible for their apperception are brought
again into play by a situation. For such a view,
memories of words, images, bodily movements are
but representatives of emotions, or affects, or at-
titudes."42 The tendency to condense and distort
events when they are reproduced is an important
Freudian construction:"
Laboratory experimentation with Freudian
theory has been difficult. The processes of con-
sciousness are subtle and expansive, and not easily
reduced to experiment. However, existing experi-
mental results tend generally to reflect favorably
on psychoanalytic concepts of memory. Events
associated with a sense of shame and guilt are for-
gotten,4 though the explanation for this particular
40 FREUD, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF EVERYDAY LIFE
passim (Brill trans., 2d ed. 1948). Cf. FREUD, THE
INTERPRETATION OF DREAM S (Brill trans., 3d ed. 1927).4 1 RAPAPORT, EMOTIONS AND MEMORY (1942).42 RAPAPORT, DIAGNOSTIC PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING,
V.II, p. 17 (1946). The statement is based on his earlier
analysis of the relationship of emotion and memory.
See note 41, supra.43 See FREUD, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF EVERYDAY
LrFE, 174-75 (Brill trans. 2d ed. 1948). Condensation,
distortion and displacement are important niechanisins
relating to unconscious processes and significantly
affect behavior products. They are treated at some
length in one of Freud's most important works, THE
INTERPRETATION OF DREAMS (Brill trans. 3d. ed. 1927).
"ZELLER, An Experimental Analogue of Repression.
II. The Effect of Individual Failure and Success in
Menory Measured by Relearning, 40 3_ Exp. Psv. 411
(1950). In this experiment, the subject is given two
tasks at a given time and place. He completes one suc-
cessfully and is shamed for failure in the other. His
recall of the successful task is then measured. This is
result may as well be posited in terms of poor initial
learning or perception. Most studies tend to show
that there is greater recall for pleasant than for
unpleasant experiences.45 The "Zeigarnik effect""
in interrupted tasks has been vitiated where a lack
of motivation for the task has been demonstrated. 47
It has also been demonstrated that the effectiveness
of recall is directly related to the strength of the
affect attached to the experience."
Schilder, generalizing as to the impact of the
emotions on memory, states that "Forgetting
proves to be an attitude with a goal and an aim.149
The psychoanalytic view of memory is today a very
forceful view that accounts fully for the concept of
consciousness and, in the same stroke, can expli-
cate learning and perception. Its enduring con-
tribution to a succinct concept of memory is a dis-
position to an analytic frame of reference, and
recognition that memory is a dynamic process
structured by pressing thoughts and feelings.
INDIVIDUAL VARIATIONS AND THE MEMORY PROCESS
Conceptualization has increasingly leaned
toward an elaboration of the basic thesis that
memory is most of all a product of intra-organismic
interpretation. Individual preferences and indi-
vidual differences are the major sources of dis-
followed by a successful completion of the failed task,
and then another evaluation of the recall of the first
task. Invariably the recall after the "removal" of the
shame associated with one of the tasks is superior. The
result, while it can be used to validate the psychoana-
lytic hypothesis, can also be explained in terms of poor
initial learning of the first task, with relatively less
recall the first time a function of poor learning, not
repression. For a variant in the technique and essen-
tially the same result, see SEALS, Initiation of the Re-
pression Sequence by Experienced Failure, 20 J. Exr.
Psy. 570 (1937).45 MELTZER, Individdal Differences in Forgetting
Pleasant and Unpleasant Experiences, 21 J. EDUc.
Psy. 399 (1930); JERSILD, Memory for the Pleasant as
Compared With the Unpleasant, 14 J. ExP. Psy. 284
(1931); STAGNER, The Redintegration of Pleasant and
Unpleasant Experiences, 43 AM. J. PsY. 463 (1931).
See also the analysis of experimental results and dis-
cussion by SEARS, Experimental Analysis of Psycho-
analytic Phenomena, pp. 321-24, in HuNT, cd., PER-
SONALITY AND THE BEHAVTOR DISORDERS, V.1 (1944),
and by MILLER, UNcoNsciousNEss 252-55 (1942).
46 See note 37 and related text.
47 See note 38.48 WATERS AND IbEEPER, The Relation of A fjective
Tone to the Retention of Experiences of Daily Life, 18
J. Exp. Psy. 203 (1936). In this experiment, students
who represented experiences over a particular period
as making a strong impression upon them, remembered




coloration in the true memory of past events. The
clinical experiences and the experimentation of
psychology and psychiatry offer a number of re-
liable indices of memory behavior associated with
individual variations. The personal factors of age,
intelligence, brain injury and emotional disturb-
ance are the best documented and most reliable
discriminants.
The extremities of youth and age are charac-
terized by the failure or undependability of certain
aspects of memory. The advancing degeneration
associated with old age contributes to a gradually
extending amnesia, with memory failures most
likely to be manifest in persons over sixty-five years
of age.M The failure tends to be most prominent in
connection with the recall of recent events. While
the impairment is initially "spotty", resulting in
the failure to recall some events or some aspects
of a recent event, it becomes increasingly diffuse
with the advancement of age and deterioration.
The memory failure "reaches further and further
back, and gaps are filled in by fabrications. Patches
of amnesia increase until there is a complete and
continuous loss of memory extending into child-
hood."-" Ultimately, only fragments of personal
memories may remain.
The unreliabilities of the memory and report of
children are most generally associated with the
incomplete development of their capacities. 52 Per-
ceptual discriminations may not be refined, spans
of concentration and attention are more limited,
and language facilities are not sufficiently well-
developed for precise reporting. The capacities
for remembering events experienced are most
limited in younger children, increase gradually up
to mental maturity (in the teens) and remain stable
until senile changes set in.Y A number of experi-
ments have been conducted to measure the ac-
curacy with which children describe a situation or
relate the details of an event previously experi-
enced.M The results in the three to seven year age
50 See HENDERSON ND GILLESPIE, TExTBOOK OF
PsYcHiAaRY 509-10 (7th ed. 1950). Cf. NoYEs, MODERN
CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 125-28 (4th ed. 1953).
51 HENDERSON AND GILLESPIE, id. at 510.
5z Investigations of memory in children are reviewed
by MVNN, PSYCHOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT C. 11 (1938).
Munn also presents a slightly more recent review of
the experimental literature in his chapter Learning in
Children, pp. 401-423, in CARMICHAEL, ed., MANUAL
OF CHILD'PSYCHOLOGY (1946).
51 See CURTI, CHILD PSYcHOLOGY 155-57 (2d ed.
1939).
54 Some of the earliest and classical work in this area
was done by Stern in relation to the problem of the
validity of testimony. STERN, ZUR PSYCHOLOGIE DER
range indicate that there is rapid improvement in
accuracy in the earlier years, with a more gradual
improvement thereafter. 55 The differences in rate
of improvement between the age levels of nine and
fourteen are small.56
Memory is not only influenced by intelligence
but is, in fact, a component in most conceptions
and measures of inteligence. "An adequate as-
sessment of the... efficiency of intelligence is not
possible without a test of [the] efficiency of mem-
ory."' ' The greater the intellectual endowments
of an individual, other things being equal, the more
likely will his memory function efficiently.H8 Char-
acteristics of memory functioning have been
graded, both within intelligence measures and in
independent measures of memory. These tests pro-
vide a scale of judgments as to the effectiveness
of an individual's memory relative to others of
comparable age and relative to other facilities in
his intellectual make-up. 59 The high correlation of
memory functioning with general intellectual func-
tioning points to estimations of intelligence as a
relatively useful criterion of the reliability of mem-
ory, where other more explicit evaluations are
unavailable.6
0
AUSSAGE (1902). The aussage tests which he developed
required individuals to give reports from memory of
experimentally contrived incidents which they ob-
served. An alternative procedure required the subjects
to report memories of pictures which they were given
to view. The results achieved were not reflections of
memory alone. They simultaneously reflected, in addi-
tion to memory, the accuracy of original perception,
vocabulary and facility with language, and proneness
to fantasy. A brief description of Stern's technique and
results is presented in AL.PORT AND POSTAN, THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF RumOR 50-53 (1947).
5 5 WnCH, CHILDREN'S PERCEPTIONS (1914).
5 McGEocH, The Influence of Sex and Age Upon the
Ability to Report, 40 Am. J. Psy. 458 (1928).
57 RAIAPORT, DIAGNOSTIC PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING
V.1, p. 319 (1945). Cf. THURSTOitE, PR1MARY MENTAL
ABILITIEs (1938), WECIHSLER, THE MEASUREMENT OF
ADuLT INTELLIGENCE 85--87 (1939). Thurstone isolated
seven factors in intelligence, one of which constituted
memory. Wechsler incorporates a subtest involving an
individual's ability to recall increasingly difficult spans
of digits in his widely used adult intelligence scales. A
test of digit span is a traditional feature of individually
administered intelligence tests.
58 RAPAPORT, id. at 325.
,5 Cf. note 57 supra; also, WEcuSLER, A Standardized
Memory Scale for Clinical Use, 19 J. PSYCHOL. 87
(1945).
60 Note, however, that the inference of the quality
of memory from the quality of intelligence cannot be
made categorically. To take an extreme and dramatic
example, certain mentally defective individuals have
some exaggerated memory facilities. These persons,
referred to as idiols savants. may have a superior skill
or ability in recalling a list of numbers, or in recalling
[Vol. 50
BASIS OF EVIDENCE PRACTICES
Cerebral injury and the impairment of cerebral
functioning notably interfere with the working of
intelligence and the processes of memory."' The
processes of senescence offer one manifestation of
the effects of impaired cerebral function on memory
behavior. In cases of traumatic brain injury, as in
the instance of an accident concerning which an
individual is asked to report, there may be localized
amnesia which persists for events immediately
before and immediately after the accident.62
Structural or toxic changes in the brain maybe in-
duced by accidental events resulting in head injury
or cerebral damage, 2 or as a consequence of medi-
cal and surgical intervention in cerebral function-
ing.14 Varying degrees of memory debility may
result, depending on the nature and extent of
injury or intervention. The more temporary the
character of the injury, the more likely will the
brain regain its normal capacities and memory
be recovered.
65
Psychological imbalances may be associated
a specific kind of dates, events or other information.
See TREDGOLD, A TEXTBOOK OF MENTAL DEricENcY
c. 15 (8th ed. 1952).
6 LANnEs AN BOLLES, TEXTBOOK OF ABNORMAL
PSYCHOLOGY 482-86 (Rev. ed. 1950). Cf. HENDERSON
AND GrrLxsPI, A TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY c. 14(7th ed. 1950), and HALSTEAD, BRAIN AND INTELLI-
GENCE (1947).
12RunOLP, Brief Retrograde Amnesia, 93 J. MENT.
Scr. 342 (1947); see also NOYES, MODERN CLINICAL
Ps c cATRa c. 11 (4th ed. 1953). Rudolph analyzed
the nature and extent of the memory difficulties of 117
cases of amnesia relating to injuries and other traumatic
experiences. In many of his cases, however, memory
defect was held to be mostly a function of repression
due to fear rather than brain injury. The distinction
between psychogenetic and organically caused memory
debility may be difficult to establish. Memory was
generally recoverable.
See NoYEs, ibid.
" See ZuBrN, Memory Functioning in Patients Treated
With Electric Shock Therapy, 17 J. PERSON. 33 (1948);
but see CoLu cruA-GREYsTONE ASSOCIATES, SE=CTrvE
PARTIAL ABLATION OF THE FRONTAL CORTEX C. 23
(1949). Zubin discovered that there are wide individual
variations in memory disturbances following the ad-
ministration of electroconvulsive therapy to mental
patients. In general, information acquired a short time
before the administration of a shock treatment was
forgotten and was difficult to recover without virtually
complete relearning. Older information tended to sur-
vive better in memory. His findings indicate that
memory tends to become disorganized for varying
periods after shock, but memory is generally not
destroyed.
The extensive tests of patients following leucotomy
(removal of part of the frontal lobes of the brain,
presumably affecting mental functioning) failed to show
evidence of memory disturbance in the Columbia-
Greystone Project.
65 See Ruorx, op. cit. supra at note 62.
with organic debilities in the production of memory
disturbances. Deterioration due to chronic alco-
holism may involve both psychological and organic
disorders.66 Impairment of memory is a symptom,
and may be associated with an inability to think
dearly, a loss of intellectual grasp generally, and
the dominance of emotions reflected in outbursts
and mood changes. Cerebral arteriosclerosis ac-
companied by psychosis may produce memory
failureYr The inability to recall names is especially
common. The failure tends to be capricious, the
same name being recalled at one time and forgotten
another. With increasing disturbance the memory
defect becomes more general and gradually extends
from recent to remote events. At times, gaps in
memory may be supplied with fabrications.
Emotionally distressed individuals are notably
susceptible to functional memory disorders. In
large part this may be a function of faulty percep-
tion. With increasing disturbances of conscious-
ness the objectivity of perception and responsive
thought processes is impaired. Distortions in im-
pression take place as a response to internal needs
and preferences."' A further restructuring and re-
interpretation of events takes place within the
mind, with emotional states strongly coloring the
conceptual formation and ultimate memory of the
original perception. The nature of the memory
disturbance varies with the type of emotional dis-
turbance. The extent of the impairment is usually
a function of the degree of psychopathology.
Falsification or distortion of memory is par-
ticularly pronounced where an individual reflects
an acute sense of insecurity and an immature out-
look on life. Fabrications reflect -an attempt to
achieve status and recognition, and dispel any
doubts as to one's efficiency. An exaggerated in-
stance of this underlying process is revealed in the
6 See OVERHOLSER AND RICuMOND, HANDBOOK OF
PSYCHIATRY 90 (1947). Korsakoffs psychosis is a par-
ticular form of alcoholic psychosis in which an impor-
tant distinguishing characteristic is the fact of poor
retention for recent events accompanied by a tendency
to fabricate where gaps in memory exist. The disease
is associated with persons past fifty and memory may
not be recovered. It is frequently used as an example
to demonstrate memory failure in mental illness. See
HENDERSON AND GILLESPIE, TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY
444-45 (7th ed. 1950).
67 See HENDERSON AND GILLESPIE, id. at 519-20.
63 See HUNT, Psychological Experiments With Die-
ordered Persons, 33 Psy. BuLL. 1 (1936). Hunt sum-
marized a number of experimental studies of memory
defect. His findings indicate that the emotionally
disturbed person manifests his disturbance in percep-
tion and thought, thus predisposing toward what would
appear to be a faulty memory.
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"pathological liar." 9 Generally complacent and
giving an air of confidence, the pathological liar is
gay and full of information, much of which may
be superficial and unreliable. He liberally inter-
twines true and false details in drawing upon his
memory. Though apparently sincere in his belief
as to the veracity of his statements, he may have
an underlying realization that he is fabricating. In
his adulthood proclivities for liberalizing the truth,
he is continuing in exaggerated form a tendency
that may be part of a developmental process in
childhood.
Falsification may also accompany certain in-
stances of an exaggerated memory facility. Overly
sensitive individuals, inclined toward inordinate
fear and suspicion, are most likely to have a vivid
recollection of various aspects of those events about
which they reflect greatest sensitivity and concern.
In an extreme form, those individuals who are
markedly paranoid and are denoted as paranoid
reaction types7 are likely to have an abnormally
pronounced memory of events related to their de-
lusional preoccupations with persecution and
grandeur. Fabrication of missing or distressing
elements in conformity with the orientation of the
delusion may be anticipated. Markedly erratic,
occupied and overactive individuals, who in their
extreme suffer from mania and hypomania,7 1 are
also likely to have an exceedingly alert recollection
of events. This is embroidered by a flight of asso-
ciations and ideas that may markedly distort the
memory.
Memory defects are increasingly pronounced
with increasingly severe psychotic conditions. The
greater the individual's confusion in his relation-
ship to life realities, the more overpowering his
self-preoccupations and the more bizarre his think-
ing and feeling processes, the greater is the likeli-
hood of an undependable report of past events.
Experimental studies have demonstrated that
psychotic individuals are comparatively inefficient
in memory tests.72 It is, however, their impression
that suffers more than their retention. Perception
is markedly clouded and may be distorted, and
19 See HENDERSON AND GiLLESPIE, id. at 399-402.
70 Paranoia and paranoid reaction types are described
extensively by HENDERSON AND GILLESPrE, id., c. 11.
See also NoyEs, MODERN CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY,
125-26 and c. 28 (4th ed. 1953).
7 See NOYES, op. cit. supra note 70 at pp. 121, 333-
37 and HENDERSON AND GILLESPIE, op. cit. supra note
66, at pp. 230-44.
72 See note 68 supra.
their fund of available and socially meaningful
information is reduced.
Marked fears and anxieties may in themselves
contribute to the loss or functional impairment of
memory. In a pathological extreme of phobias and
in other manifestations of the neurotic condition
known as "hysteria," the repression of psycho-
logically painful and distressing events may take
place.,n There is a consciously indeliberate but
subtle and definite blocking out of the unpleasant
events, and a resistance to the development of
associations that my bring them to mind. Only
under conditions of marked reassurance and the
dispelling of anxiety is the repressed event likely
to return to consciousness. It may be generally
stated, even in the absence of pronounced psycho-
logical disorders, that intense unpleasant emotion
and anxiety inhibit memorv 4
THE ESTIMATION OF MEMORY BEHAVIOR
It has been suggested that the presumption is
probably warranted to the effect that a random
person, given accurate original perception, will in
the ordinary course of events reflect a memory com-"
petent to serve most of the purposes for which it
is demanded. An effective challenge to this prob-
ability may be posited in terms of (1) personal
characteristics that influence memory functioning,
71 See HENDRICK, FACTS AND THOiREs OF Psycno-
ANALYSIS, passimt (1st ed. 1939). Repression is the
major mechanism of hysteria and the major construct
in the Freudian system. Repression "consists of an
unconsciously purposeful forgetting or not becoming
aware of internal impulses or external events... (it is)
initiated to hinder their real effects as well as the pain
on becoming aware of them ... although the repressed
is not felt consciously it remains effective." FENICHEL,
PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY OF NEUROSES 148 (1945).
Repression has been demonstrated in a number of
experimental studies. See MIALAMUD AND LINDER,
Dreams and Their Rdationship to Recent Impressions,
25 ARCH. NEUR. AND PSYCHIAT. 1081 (1931) subjects
were asked to recall a picture shown to them; omissions
in their recall were later identified and analyzed in their
dream material). See also notes 44, 45 and 48 supra.
Dissociation, resulting in the "splitting off"' and
hence forgetting, of large segments of experience and
whole areas of personality was described in the pioneer
work of PRINCE, THE DIssOCLATIoN OF A PERSONALITY
(1920). Split personalities represent extreme and dra-
matic instances of molar memory failure accountable
to the operation of unconscious mechanisms.
71 See HENDRICK, op. cit. supra note 73, particularly
c. 7. DASHIELL, in the first edition of a general treatise
on psychology, describes the effects of anxiety and
intense emotion on memory in the commonplace ex-
perience of a school examination. DAsHiELL, FUNDA-
MENTALS OF GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY 430 (Ist ed. 1937).
In some instances, anxiety virtually disorganizes
memory completely.
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(2) general intellectual facilities that characterize
memory, and in terms of (3) specific sets of re-
lationship that qualify the adequacy of memory
for a particular event or set of events.
The personal conditions of memory performance
provide the essential cues and characteristics
through which an acutely perceptive individual is
able to entertain reasonable suspicion of another
person's memory deficiency. They are the basis for
the more minute inspection of memory provided
in the more formal assessment of memory skills.
Consciousness of cues and characteristics will
direct the observer to seek out from the total con-
text of an individual's behavior such factors as
exceptional youth and advanced age, limited in-
telligence, acute anxiety and fear, inordinate
suspicion and doubt, evidence of brain injury, im-
maturity and superficiality, confusion and pre-
occupation, chronic alcoholism, and erraticism
and flightiness.
An adequate and appropriate suspicion of mem-
ory defect warrants a more concerted examination
of the memory processes. The formal assessment
of memory as an abstract entity is a characteristic
procedure in psychiatric examination and in clini-
cal psychological examination where deficiencies
are suspected. The psychiatric and psychological
measurements offer the most systematic bases
available for the judgment of memory function-
ing. Formal examinations of memory as an ab-
stract entity encompass particular kinds of skills.
Short-hand assessments, such as those provided
in psychiatric examinations, 5 evaluate the indi-
vidual's facility for recalling remote events8 and
recent events', and his capacity for retention of
simple communications.78 More elaborate, formal
76 See HENDERSON AND GILLESPIE, TExTBooK OF
Ps crmATRY 102-03 (7th ed. 1950); see also STRECKER,
FUNDAmENTAs OF PsYcinATRY 83 (5th ed. 1952) and
NOYES, MODERN CLINICAL PsycwAR Y 148 (4th ed.
1953). Cf. WELLS AND REuscH, MENTAL EXAsINER'S
HANDBOOK (1945).
76 Patients are generally asked to give a chronological
account of their life experiences. Specific information
is requested on such facts as date and place of birth,
age upon entering and leaving school, time of. marriage,
names and ages of children, and data concerning em-
ployment.
77 Memory for recent events is frequently tested by
such questions as "When did you come here?" "Where
from?" "What were you doing yesterday?" Etc.
Failures in response are more likely to reflect gross
memory disturbance.78 Patients may be orally given simple information,
such as a street address, a name, a color, etc. After a
brief interval their recollection for the information is
tested. Facility for recalling spans of digits, words or
psychological examinations, such as the Wechsler
Memory Scale, 9 assess the individual's fund of
personal and current information, his immediate
orientation to time and place, his immediate recall
of logical material, his memory span for digits, his
reproduction of simple geometric figures from mem-
ory, his ability to learn the pairings of words and
his mental control.8 0, s s2 Memory in such exam-
ination is conceived as a composite of objective
self-awareness, adequate perceptual orientation,
capable association of ideas, ability to retain, recall
and reproduce, and ability for coherent and
rational thought organization and responsiveness.
Abbreviated assessments of each of these charac-
teristics collectively reflect memory facility. The
results of formal examination may be reduced to
a standardized measure and interpreted in rela-
letters, and the testing of recall for words associated
in pairing with other, stimulus words, may also be
attempted.
7 WECHSLER, A Standardized Memory Scale for
Clinical Use, 19 J. PSYCHOL. 87 (1945). There is also
an alternate form. STONE, GiRDNER AND ALBRECHT,
An Alternate Form of the Wechsler AMemory Scale, 22
3. PSYCnOL. 199 (1946).
80 "Mental control," as used in the test, refers to
the subject's ability to associate and respond quickly
and accurately. He is asked to count backwards, repeat
the alphabet and count by threes.
81 The Wechsler Memory Scale is described in some
detail in WEIDER, CONTRIBUTIONS TowARD MEDICAL
PSYCHOLOGY, V.1I, p. 757 (1953). References to the
technique and critical reviews are provided in BUROS,
THE FOURTH MENTAL MEAsuREMETxrs YEARBOOK
364-66 (1953). Akin to most psychological test tech-
niques, it is the subject of constant experimentation.
Its validity and reliability are substantially less than
perfect but it appears to be particularly useful as a
clinical instrument, relying heavily upon the examiner's
skill for effective interpretation. The scale, in any event,
is most likely to reveal gross memory disturbances.
Skillful clinical use and analysis of the technique is
demonstrated by HOL7BERG in his case, A Carpenter
With Brain Damage, in BURTON AND HARRIS, eds.,
CLINICAL STUDIES OF PERSONAITY, V. 2, pp. 415-422
(1955).
8, Other tests, geared partially or completely to the
assessment of memory, measure some of the same
facilities. The Babcock Test of Mental Deterioration,
for example, assesses the adequacy of paragraph
reproduction and sentence repetition, memory for
designs and the adequacy of association of paired
words. See BuR.os, op. cit. supra note 81, at p. 31.
Cf. Hunt-Minnesota Test for Organic Brain Damage,
briefly described and discussed in WEIDER, op. cit.
stpra note 81, pp. 760-65. See also brief description
of other lesser known memory tests in ANASTASI,
PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING 337-38 (1954).
Most memory tests have. been used to detect gross
disorders as part of an attempt to assess whether there
is a significant impairment in the intellectual func-
tioning of a patient suggestive of possible brain injury.
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t ion to standardized results achieved by large
populations of age-segregated individuals.n
The reliability of memory for a particular event
is inferrable from the operation of general memory
processes. It can be more exactly determined,
however, by an acute evaluation of time and per-
sonal exponents in the relationship between the
person and the event sought to be remembered.
Inquiry will be directed to the meaningfulness and
vividness of the event to the individual, and his
emotional relationship to it, with a particular focus
on elements of fear and unpleasantness. The in-
tensity of original perception, degree of preoccupa-
tion at the time, concern or interest in the event,
the amount of turbulence occurring in the same
activity context at the time of and subsequent to
the event, characteristics of the event that are
unique to general experience, and the recency and
duration of occurrence are of established impor-
tance in considering the reliability of memory.
111. THE IMPLICATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
THOUGHT AND KNOWLEDGE FOR LEGAL
PRACTIcES RELATING TO MEMORY
Juxtaposition of the premises of law and the
views and findings of psychology concerning
memory may at least serve to project the status of
evidence law in this area from the perspective of
a studied knowledge of the subject matter. The
bases of some evidence rules and practices become
more articulate and systematic; others seem to be
more disreputable than the casual and uninformed
observer admits.
It is apparent today that any single existing con-
ceptual definition of memory is incomplete.
Furthermore, the substances of memory lack a
vigorous delineation in point of both theory and
practice. Memory is a label of practical convenience
to describe the operation of learning, perceptual
and emotional processes expressed in terms of
certain phenomena operative in objective reality.
These phenomena are for the most part inde-
pendently verifiable as facts existing in a universe
that are subject to common observation and in-
8 The Wechsler Memory Scale provides a "memory
quotient," corrected for deficiencies due to age. The
memory quotient corresponds fairly closely to in-
telligence quotients on the Wechsler intelligence scales.
In fact. the basis for these latter quotients, existing in
the scores of hundreds of subjects and adjusted for
age, serves as the basis for determining the memory
quotient to be derived from memory scores. See WEcus-
LER, MANUAL FOR THE WECHSLER MEMORY SCALE,
New York: The Psychological Corporation (1946).
terpretation. An example of such a phenomenon
would be the recollection that it rained in a par-
ticular place some particular time in the past. The
event is, at least theoretically, a matter of common
experience and agreement. Verification of this
particular fact establishes that the individual's
learning has been effective, his perception was cor-
rect and his emotions were not distortive in rela-
tion to the event.
Verification by objective or consensual criteria
may, however, be difficult or impossible in many
fact situations with which law deals. It may not be
possible to test the memory product offered by an
individual for lack of a complete and objective
record of the fact. Examination must then focus
upon the processes associated with memory. The
accuracy and reliability of memory products are
inferrable from the order and efficiency of the
processes. It is in this situation that conceptual
faults and the lack of ultimate definition in memory
substances lead to the vagaries and uncertainties
that are a common characteristic of memory as-
sessment. Different conceptual orientations em-
phasize different desiderata as the essentiali of
memory processes, and interpret memory func-
tioning in terms of performance with these de-
siderta. In learning theory, time is one of the more
important substances and performance in the
course of time is used as a determinant of the ade-
quacy of memory. Perceptual theory offers fewer
memory fact-substances than learning theory. Such
conceptual integrity as memory may have in this
system is largely sacrificed to the need to explain
perception. The substances that may test memory,
incongruity, nonconformity, etc., are mostly in-
verted so as to amplify the concept of perception.
In psychoanalytic theory the behavior of the
emotions is the most important fact-substance,
and memory operation is interpreted in terms of the
emotional propensities and conduct of the in-
dividual.
The assessor of memory who operates outside
of the context of theory construction and theory
testing in psychology is, to a certain extent, left
to his own devices in determining the scope of
memory, its parameters and appropriate methods
of measurement. The state of the law in treating
memory can be taken as an appropriate reflection
of the lack of definition in this field. Memory is not
defined and graded for the purpose of establishing
the competence of a witness to testify. Disqualifi-
cation of testimony by reason of poor memory is
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a matter of impression, not definitive assessment.
"Impressions" or "beliefs" are given some proba-
tive value as instances of memory. Examination
of the processes of memory is really examination
of the processes of observation and logic. There is
no dear-cut basis for distinction between a present
memory refreshed and a past memory recorded.
However, the legal theory of memory is not en-
tirely nebulous. Memory in law, whatever it is,
has fixed characteristics of relative order and regu-
larity for each individual. To the extent that psy-
chology recognizes and attempts to assess memory
in the abstract, there is some theoretical basis for
this view. That the conception may be merely one
of practical convenience and not one of theoretical
vigor may not be so offensive as to destroy its
value. But the law goes further. It asserts that the
characteristic is fixed in relation to nearly all
circumstances, so that its manifestation in one or
more past or present circumstances, or in an ab-
stract instance, is sufficiently reliable evidence
of its deportment under all conditions. With this
psychology is not in unequivocal agreement, and
may not be in agreement at all. It may be possible
to characterize an individual's memory in general
terms, assuming a general equality and stability
of conditions. But the events with which law is
concerned in litigation are not necessarily normal,
anticipated and stable. They may frequently be
characterized by or tend to evoke unusual, strange
and abnormal conditions. In these circumstances,
psychology recognizes that the individual's
memory cannot be accurately assessed by his
usual behavior and propensities. A more meticulous
analysis of the person's feelings and his experience
in relation to the event is necessary. Memory
for events are therefore likely to be unequal,
not so much because of deficiencies in individ-
ual capacity but because of unequal charac-
teristics of the events themselves. The nature and
description of the events selected to test memory
are in themselves exponents of memory per-
formance and, if not regulated, provide no ade-
quate memory measure.84 The invariable court-
room practice of permitting generally free-ranging
examination of memory for past and present
events, with the common presumption that a series
84 Though a charitable view allows that the judge
or jury do give consideration to the particular condi-
tions and circumstances that might govern memory,
and particularly memory failure (See text at page 16),
it seems unlikely that this in fact happens. That the
conditions and circumstances are systematically
evaluated is surely doubtful.
of failures reflects general deficiency, is at least
questionable.
Law also conditions the operation of memory
on the basis of time lapse, establishing the pre-
sumption of an inverse relationship between ef-
fective memory and the occurrence of an event.
With this psychology would agree, and would sup-
port the legal view that no categorical time limit
for the effective recall of an event may be set.
Characteristic individual differences preempt such
a general decision. But psychology will not assert
that time interval in itself safeguards the cor-
rectness of a memory and justifies a categorical
presumption in favor of accuracy. This distinction
on which the "past recollection recorded" hearsay
exception rests is a product of incomplete under-
standing of memory and, probably, a consequent
faulty application in the form of a mechanical
rule. Elapsed time is an important factor in the
adequate recall of an event, but it may have no
unique merit for safeguarding the memory when
opposed to such other desiderata as the meaning
of the experience to the individual, the intensity
of original perception, interest-in the event, emo-
tional disposition of the observer, the diffusion
of associated circumstances, etc. Any one element
is probably not a sufficient definition for the re-
lationship between an event and its true recall.
Legal practice also permits the solicitation of
memory through the introduction of fragmentary
cues. Psychology would agree that this can be
effective procedure, and it would agree with the
law that there may not be an immediate founda-
tion for the probable correctness of the recall,
because of the lack of evident logic of the stimulus
material. But that the connection between stimulus
and recall may not be evident does not mean that
it cannot or will not be evident. Where the matter
to be recalled may be the subject of repression it
is commonplace that the stimulus to consciousness
may be, and of psychological necessity may have
to be, symbolic in character. It will be devoid of
an immediate logical reference and will be sub-
jectively understood. On the other band, a factual
rather than a symbolic cue may sometimes be ef-
fective in stimulating the chain of associations
that will eventuate in more complete memory.
The cue is a logical part of the total experience and
subject to inspection for its logical connection and
probable inducement to accurate recall.85
85"In point of legal practice it may be difficult to
distinguish when a cue is being used symbolically and
when it is being used factually. The use of cues for
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The conceptual status and the reputable facts
and techniques with which law operates in the
field of memory are but minima. Notwithstanding
the lack of full comprehension and semblance of
finality in the handling of memory by psychology,
law can draw upon psychology's more concentrated
efforts in this field to evolve better definitions,
characteristics and techniques than it now utilizes.
A crude conceptual framework can be con-
structed. Memory is a process whose outcome is
dependent upon intra-individual operations. These
operations have certain universal features. The
features are modifiable by the general character
of memory operation in specific individuals. They
are further modifiable by distinguishable elements
relating to particular events. These particular
elements may have general effects on the memory
operation of nearly all individuals, and they may
have differential effects on the memory operation
of particular individuals.
Memory is a function of original perception.
It is dependent upon intellectual capacities, par-
ticularly for association and logical organization.
It is influenced by the operation of emotion. The
processes of perception, cognition and emotion
interact and are functionally non-separable.
Extreme youth or age, brain injury, and acute
states of emotional disturbance, with or with-
out advanced psychopathology, may preju-
dicially affect memory behavior. The inhibition
or distortion of normal perception, cognition and
emotion may create significant memory dis-
turbances and unreliabilities.
Memory for a particular event may also be a
function of the dimensions of time and meaning
of the event itself, and of time and meaning as
carried through experience. Elapsed time since
the event, the event's meaningfulness to the indi-
vidual in general and personal terms, the intensity
and duration of its occurrence, and its uniqueness
in general or personal experience, may be im-
portant determinants of memory sufficiency and
accuracy. Exaggerated personal characteristics of
age and organic or emotional status may result
cross-examination and their presentation before a jury
is in some instances ill-advised if they would directly or
impliedly reflect upon the value of present memory to
be inferred from the logic and relevance of the aids.
The inference is largely justified when factual cues are
used, but the devaluation of present memory because
of the apparent failure of a demonstrated logical re-
lationship and relevance between symbolic cue and
memory content is unfortunate and unwarranted. Cf.
notes 10-13 supra and related text.
in the dimensions of a particular event having
highly individualistic effects on memory. Elapsed
time may not have an inverse effect upon memory
efficiency, the intensity and duration of an event
may not have its usual or expected effects, the
meaningfulness of an event may be implausible
or diluted, etc.
Within this more complete conceptual frame-
work memory must be conceived as a phenomenon
of the individual to be studied in the context of
his characteristics and experience. This, however,
may frequently be too exacting and unrealistic
for legal contexts. It becomes more feasible and
less of a formal necessity with the expert training
and accompanying keener intuitions and judg-
ments of judge or jury.s6 It may in any event be
necessary in those instances where any single
memory or set of memories is so utterly crucial
for reasonable and fair decision. Evidence rules
and practices ought to permit and define memory
examination for an event in issue, and thereby
guide the court in its discretion concerning exam-
ination in these and other instances. One phase
of examination should be directed to the perceptual
opportunities and the conditions for memory, the
quality of the event and the quality of the ex-
perience had by the observer. Much of this testi-
mony may be collateral to the basic issues in the
case but its introduction must be weighed in the
light of competing merits of expediency and truth
in any given instance. If restriction be made it
ought to be upon the extent of the examination
in all areas and not upon total inquiry into any
one area. The validity of memory analysis is
thereby better safeguarded.
Considerations of expediency and the extensity
and exceptional skill required in the phase of
examination suggested above, may operate in
favor of a general preference for only the simpler
"6The training of decision-makers, particularlyjudges, in at least some of the nuances of individual
differences is a large problem-area in itself. An aware-
ness of such differences is generally a gratuitous ac-
companiment of alertness and intelligence. Subtler
distinctions may today often as not reflect prejudice
based on ignorance, rather than informed opinion. A
greater degree of training in and information about
psychology is, of course, helpful. One learned judge,
Jerome Frank, has gone further and advocated some
systematic course of self-exploration as a part of judicial
training. This better prepares a person to understand
individual and interpersonal behavior. See FRg4K,
COLrTS ON TRIAL 247-53 (1949). Perhaps some com-
bination of systematic personal exploration and formal
study in psychology offers the promise of decision-
makers who are more sensitive and sophisticated about
people's actions and attitudes.
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and briefer assessments provided in the second
phase of memory testing. General memory com-
petence may be determined .as the basis for in-
ference concerning the operation of memory in
the particular instance in issue. Evaluation of
memory skills alone may be reasonable and ade-
quately valid for any given case where the is-
suable event for which memory is sought is not,
from general appearances, markedly peculiar to
common experience or to the personal experience
of the witness. An adequate assessment of general
memory competence must relate to the perceptual
and cognitive skills and the emotional status of the
individual. Testing perceptual and cognitive skills
can be done by objective examination, largely
through the use of impersonal questions, conducted
by the legal examiner in court, by a memory expert
(generally a psychologist) in or out of court, or
by standardized examination.8Y A reasonably
comprehensive and valid examination, though
brief,n8 will traverse those elements of perception
and cognition that are particularly important to
memory. 9 Superficial and single tests, of simple
observation for instance, may be insufficient to
justify any substantial inferences about memory.
The examination of emotional status is a greater
challenge to tactical skills and necessitates more
stringent requirements if validity is to be
assumed. The danger of misinterpretation as a
product of fragmentary and distorted examina-
tion is particularly great. As a practical safe-
guard, formal courtroom examination of memory
capacity should perhaps be limited to assessments
of perception and cognition. Evidence of emo-
tional status would be garnered impressionistically
by judge or jury, 0 supplemented by psychiatric
or psychological records of reasonably current dis-
8 Cf. notes 75-83 supra and related text.
3 Most memory examinations are brief and take
under ten minutes. The Wechsler Memory Scale,
perhaps the most comprehensive memory examination
utilized today, takes an average of fifteen minutes to
administer, and can be scored and rated in another
five or ten minutes.
0 Common measures of perception and cognition
in memory relate to the adequacy of assodiation in
recalling simple life experiences, ability to make and
to relate simple associations with numbers, letters or
words quickly and accurately, amount of retention of
simple numbers, or of phrases or slightly more extensive
logical material, and the ability to recall simple designs
from memory. See notes 75-83 supra and related text.
Other relevant tests are, of course, possible. However,
as they become more difficult and abstract, the test
becomes more characteristically one of intelligence and
information and less a matter of memory.
11 Cf. note 86 supra.
turbances. In those instances where there is a
reasonable and firm suspicion of emotional defect
significantly affecting memory, and the nature of
a witness' memory is critical in the case at issue,
it may be desirable practice to permit petitioning
the court for objective psychological examination
or psychiatric study of the emotional status of the
witness.91 The report of such evaluation, conducted
by an impartial expert selected by the court,
would be admitted in evidence as relating to the
memory competence of the witness.
The determination of past memory failures
and present failures unrelated to the events in
issue is, of itself, an insufficient and inappropriate
index of memory capacity. To provide such de-
terminations substantial and reliable meaning,
evidence must be produced and assurances given
concerning time and meaning dimensions relating
to the events for which there are memory failures.
Reliable estimates must also be given of the per-
ceptual, cognitive and emotional facilities of the
witness at the time of the events lost to recollec-
tion. The provision of these safeguards for the
correct interpretations of poor. memory products
may involve the introduction into evidence of
considerable collateral material. It may also bring
confusion to the immediate justiciable issue of
present memory for matters of ultimate impor-
tance in the case. In any event, examination
into these collateral matters may merely dupli-
cate in scope and time the explicit examination
of immediate memory facility and memory ex-
perience for the events in issue. This latter ex-
amination is to be preferred and is sufficient for
the litigation at hand.
The refreshing of memory on the witness stand
is founded in sound psychological principle and
can be a useful and valuable device for the solicita-
tion and recovery of valuable testimonial material.
The fragmentary cues that are provided as stimuli
may or may not be, in themselves, logically rel-
evant to the matters in issue and sought to be re-
called. The distinction between symbolic and
factual association, either of which may be the
basis for memory recovery, may in any given case
be difficult and exceptionally time-consuming to
91 Cf. note 4 supra, citing instances of psychiatric
examination used to assess the credibility of witnesses.
Such evidence has most often been admitted where the
witness is the complainant in a rape case. See discussion
by McCoamcK, HANDBOOK or mnF LAw oF EViDENCE
97-100 (1954); see also CommExT, Psychiatric Evaht-




assess. The tracing of the stimulus to the memory
event, testing the process of association, may offer
some assurance of the proper functioning of mem-
ory and of a reliable product. In the instance of
symbolic cues, this is feasible for a psychoanalysis,
not for a courtroom examinationft Where the
cues are intended, evident or acknowledged to be
a factual element in the total matter to be recalled,
the introduction of the factual cue in evidence
and the examination of the association process
should be permitted. It should be required where
demanded for cross-examination.
Past recollection memos may have no particular
claim to special merit. Memoranda offered as past
recollection recorded, as well as any prior state-
ments of fact by a witness, may have some proba-
tive value for the determination of ultimate facts.
Their true value ought not to be a matter of pre-
sumption. Special evidence offered in support or
refutation of the memoranda or statements ought
to condition their value. Examination and proof
should be directed to elements of and subsequent
to the event that affect memory, and to the
memory capacity of the witness offering the past
recall. Examination should be restricted to evi-
f "Free association," the method commonly used to
trace symbolic data to real feelings and experiences is
usually a complex process involving skillful and timely
interpretations by the examiner and careful probing of
the thoughts and feelings of the subject. A lack of
carefully applied skill will most often result in erroneous
conclusions or the failure to establish a connection
between symbol and actual experience. Cf. WHTE,
Interpretation of Imaginative Productions in HIINT, ed.,
PERSONALITY AND BEHAVIOR DISORDERS, V.I., pp.
216-18 (1944); REIK, LISTENING WITH THE THIRD
EAR (1948); FROmm-REICHIAN, PRINCIPLES OF IN-
TEN IVE PSYCHOTIERAPY (1950).
dence existing at the time the memoranda or state-
ments were made. The difficulty or impossibility
of offering such evidence does not bar the examina-
tion but may limit the assumptions to be made
concerning probative value.
Theory and knowledge of memory is sufficient
to permit some refinement of an understanding
of its operation. It is adequate to permit reason-
ably precise examination. It is not so refined,
however, as to provide totally accurate or reliable
calibrations of the results of study and examina-
tion. The procedures for evaluation can be sub-
stantially knowledgeable and meticulous. Ultimate
judgments are, however, most reasonably left to
impression. Only logic and understanding can
assure and safeguard the correctness of the judge
or jury's judgments concerning a person's memory.
Memory is imbedded in a complex process, or
a complex'of processes, that are not the subject
of accurate mathematical equations. As a variable
conditioned on these processes there are no final
indices that can represent or attest to the pre-
cision of its operation. It is the subject of constant
test and interpretation modifiable in the light of
time and circumstances. Our present indices are
reasonable and reliable-they may not be final.
The expectations of litigation demand that
memory be used, and the status of our knowledge
requires that all memory be admitted in use.
Reasonableness and fair play dictate that memory
be carefully evaluated, and knowledge directs
that it be freely judged. Memory in both law and
knowledge is uncertain, but law can be made to
conform to the knowledge of memory with greater
fairness and precision than it has so far demon-
strated.
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